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Abstract. This essay deals with the question of what really makes human beings excep-
tional. It is argued that it is a special kind of love that ultimately distinguishes humans 
from other animals. Although other kinds of considerations, preferably cognitive ones, 
have most often been invoked to make such a distinction, these might eventually be 
found to be, at least in part, a matter of degree and not something qualitatively different, 
as argued here with respect to this type of love. Arguments from both scientific and 
philosophical sources are brought to bear on the question.
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I have a fifty-eight year old friend who has ten natural children, already 
grown up, with three teenagers still at home. This would not make headlines 
–not that it is necessary- if, besides, he had not adopted three other younger 
ones, two with Down syndrome and one with a neurological disorder. He and 
his wife will have to care for them until their old age when they could live 
in a well-deserved, more peaceful and comfortable situation. This doesn’t 
need to make the headlines either in spite of its extraordinariness and the 
underlying depth of … what precisely? Because this is the key thing here, 
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both difficult to put one’s finger on and characterize, at least from a purely 
naturalistic outlook.
As it will be argued, this is an example of a special kind of love which 
uniquely characterizes our species. This perspective has not often been used 
to qualify the exceptionalness of human beings. My goal is to contribute 
some thoughts about the uniqueness question from the unfrequented 
viewpoint of a capacity to love in a particular way.
1. A Natural love?
There are instances of non-human animals which show unexpected feeling 
toward other (non) human creatures (I trust the latter word will reveal where 
I stand from the beginning): a dog toward a cat, of all animals; an orangutan 
befriending a dog; a lion licking and caressing a woman; a grizzly bear 
playfully fighting with a man; not to mention many examples of dolphins 
and humans, all of them of animals with a certain level of intelligence, either 
kept in captivity or accustomed to frequent and progressive human contact 
(or even tamed, in some cases). All of these are instances of something akin 
to what C. S. Lewis (1960) characterized (in Greek) as Storge. There is even 
the example of the video gone viral in the internet of a dog befriending 
a restless little boy with Down syndrome and pouring affection all over 
him. Yes, one of those human individuals that we all get very tender and 
compassionate about on meeting them, but who are aborted at very high 
rates in the West before reaching their ninth month of existence since 
their conception, (it can be easily checked in the Web). We even give them 
awards at movie ceremonies, as it happened not long ago in Spain, or see 
them make headlines when modelling clothes on a catwalk platform (those 
lucky enough to survive).
The example from our first paragraph (that about my adopting friend) 
and the preceding one are not exactly of the same kind. I think the former 
shows a qualitative leap over the others, apart from all the differences that 
go with being and living in a world of human beings. This is not a “purely 
natural” love, for those of one’s kin, with no “selfish gene” (Dawkins 1976) 
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involved and no apparent evolutionary advantage to be had from it. Let us 
not forget that, in nature, where selection and the survival of the fittest 
reigns at large, its weakest members are often left to die by their own parents 
or are even eaten by them (those same lions who were so tender with their 
human caretaker). Furthermore, adopting those children does not seem 
to be the response of a dopamine-driven brain seeking new experiences 
either. Neither of high oxytocin levels inducing increased generosity to 
connect with strangers in a blind search for happiness; hardly the result 
of a neurotransmitter addiction. Perhaps one should put this couple under 
an fMRI machine to see what lights up in their brains in order to find an 
answer to our perplexity regarding such unusual behavior (though not that 
infrequent in kind if one cares to research it). I wonder what they would 
answer if they were asked how their brains took that decision.
I don’t expect they would consider the whole thing as somehow prede-
termined by their genomes and their interaction with their environment, 
education, upbringing, family situation, historical circumstances and cultural 
surroundings, though these must have played their part as well (I suspect 
most people tend to be unconscious of their “real”, brain-produced, sub-
conscious or atavistic evolutionary motives). However, I know how they 
would verbalize it because I have asked them. It is something they have 
experienced phenomenologically, that they are conscious of, in terms such 
as “whole family decision”. They believe that their human motives are 
such as “sharing their well-being with less fortunate ones”, “a chance to 
do specific good to others” –typical “reasons of the heart”, although they 
also think they are supernaturally oriented, in that they see the will of God 
there. These are all expressions which may have their own spot in the brain 
and one might suppose that rescuer dolphins or compassionate dogs would 
also utter... if only they could. 
And scientists could not contradict them because they cannot even tell 
us what a decision is physically: firstly, they only know that decisions take 
place in the brain, that they seem to result from its activity and that they 
are arrived at after a preceding unconscious period; secondly, because deci-
sions are taken in a brain that may be governed by quantum physics, as the 
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synapses between neurons conduct signals using parts of atoms called ions, 
subject to Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle. This says that subatomic 
particles do not occupy definite positions in space or time and we can find 
out where they are only as a series of probabilities about where they might 
be. It really does away with determinism and leaves room for the decisions 
of a free will, which in its turn may (freely) choose to be “determined” by 
that higher love, whatever its physical concomitants.
My friend’s is a kind of love not explainable by a combination of chem-
icals originated in certain parts of the body –although it must also have 
its organic reflection. Even if a natural compassion -probably felt as well 
by certain animals, like some of those mentioned above- may be part of it, 
that is clearly not the whole story. In fact, many weaklings in the animal 
kingdom, whose mothers seem to feel pity for them at first, end up all alone 
and are eventually killed by others. 
No doubt natural compassion is also involved here, but there is more 
to it: this is a love that looks at people with affection from the inside, with 
good will, not as replaceable biological units. A love which treats everyone 
as ends in themselves, as human individuals who cannot be sacrificed at 
the whim or for the sake of a majority. This love may have its natural basis 
in human nature, in an innate or well entrenched belief that everyone has 
intrinsic value no matter what their material characteristics may be (beauty, 
intelligence, refinement, class, position, prestige, standing of any kind...). 
Innate does not necessarily mean wholly genetic in this case; in fact it does 
not look like it at all.
2. Human intrinsic value
The sense of believing that everyone has intrinsic value is inscribed in most 
(sane) human individuals. Experimental proof of it is a variant of Jarvis 
Thomson’s (1985) Trolley problem, in which a great majority of people 
tested worldwide would not push an imaginary obese man off a bridge and 
onto some rails to sidetrack an upcoming train, thus killing him directly, 
in order to save five people ignorant of what is coming at them. I am not 
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aware that the test has been done using a non-human animal, let’s say a cow, 
instead, but I am quite certain that the results would be radically different 
with the same comprehensive type of sample. Perhaps the owners (mark 
the word) of that cow might react differently, especially if it were their pet 
as well. Still, theirs would be an affection they have put there, not (mostly) 
something directly inspired by the animal itself to lead anyone to the point 
of comparing it to a human individual.
The problem is that nowadays many people treat other individuals, 
especially their children, as if they owned them and gave them their value, 
thinking that they may bring them into the world when they want to and 
through any means they deem proper. Thus, their children’s intrinsic value 
is the loser for it and the whole matter becomes clouded in the bud. Many of 
us have witnessed the kind of traumas that such a mentality can produce in 
many of those “owners” when their precious possessions may not respond 
later in life as they would have liked to and are left alone by them.
Admittedly, in some societies, where children have been raised in an at-
mosphere in which a human individual life’s intrinsic worth has been erased, 
apparently through violence (there is always something more and deeper 
to it), the results of the above experiment might be different. The terms 
of the test might not even make sense at all, as, no doubt, an upbringing 
component is always there encompassing most human instincts. Still, we 
cannot think of that intrinsic value as something we put there ourselves, 
as with the cow above, but rather as a reality we just discover and should 
acknowledge somehow.
3. Personal dignity
Some people, at least in western culture, may even verbalize that intrinsic 
value by saying something like “you can’t do that to a person” and that is 
probably the key to it. The concept of person is a controversial one since 
it is not deemed to be intuitively universal but rather just an old western 
philosophical construct; still, if preferable, one could talk about “a human 
individual” instead. However, going from acknowledging the intrinsic 
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worth of an individual to loving him/her is a big leap, since there must be 
an antecedent good will (latin bene-volere, whence, benevolence). There is 
a presupposed intermediate step, though, called reverence (cf. Sheed 1953). 
All sane individuals experience it toward other fellow humans, whatever 
their individual value or lack thereof, position, capacities, virtues or ac-
complishments, which are not the source of it. Reverence must be part of 
the essence of being a person/human being, providing justification for the 
phrase “all men are (created) equal”, meaning equally men. But, just what 
is reverence precisely?
There is another concept which has traditionally been called human 
dignity, not to be confused with others such as composure, elegance, clean-
liness or maturity, let alone physical attractiveness or pride, as does Pinker 
(2008) in his invective against it. This notion, of the essence of humanity, 
is taken to be the source of the aforementioned reverence and a derived 
consequence of being a person. It presupposes considering mankind as, 
potentially at least, the only species with intelligence, will and confirmed 
consciousness about being conscious; and, as a result, with complete freedom 
-even from instinct- and, concomitantly, a moral sense and responsibili-
ty. Otherwise one is bound to believe that all these properties are mere 
illusion, epiphenomena, artifacts of brain evolution or simply products of 
evolutionary psychology. Not that a person’s dignity depends upon these 
factors but they are presuppositions to understanding it; however, there 
are human individuals who, through no fault of their own, have lost them 
or never had them and still possess dignity. 
Those who reject this notion tend to supplant it by autonomy and so are 
likely to think of intrinsic worth in terms of capacities, like the capacity to 
self-government. Thus, the number of those accepted as human is restricted, 
with some handicapped individuals being deprived of their dignity due to 
lack of autonomy, such as the three adopted ones above. That is the reason 
why few of them come to fruition nowadays in our “autonomous” west. This 
implies that in order to be considered a person, one must have an advanced 
level of brain function, a completely developed and normally functioning 
cerebral cortex. Thus, many human beings would not be persons and one 
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might choose to abort them, for example, once their genetic condition is 
established. This should logically apply also to children in general since it is 
possible to conclude that infants do not develop a sense of self-awareness, 
until about one year of age, let alone being autonomous. As the neo-natol-
ogist and emeritus professor at University College of London John Wyatt 
(2009) points out, within that framework, non-persons would include fetuses, 
newborn babies and infants who lack self-awareness, as well a large group 
of children and adults with congenital brain abnormalities, severe brain 
injury, dementia and major psychiatric illnesses.
Wyatt points out how for Princeton moral philosopher Peter Singer 
persons include only those who may want to continue living or make plans 
for the future because they grasp the meaning of their future existence. Thus, 
one cannot end their lives against their will, unlike that of those who are 
not people because they do not have that awareness. Following this line of 
reasoning, says Wyatt, not just a neonate or young infant might qualify as 
non-persons, but also an elderly human with Alzheimer’s, a human with 
profound brain damage or learning difficulties, and an individual with 
a severe and untreatable psychiatric illness.
However, many neuroscientists would argue that our conscious aware-
ness is merely an epiphenomenon of brain functioning. Following this line of 
reasoning, consciousness, Wyatt goes on ironically elsewhere, which would 
seem to make us aware of that autonomous self, has no causal importance, 
“it is merely part of the froth on the surface of unconscious brain activity” 
(Wyatt 2014). In fact they argue that our sense of a single continuing self 
is an artifact created by our brains to help our evolutionary survival. Thus, 
Wyatt concludes, “there is no self at all, there is no ghost in the machine, 
there is just the machine” (Wyatt 2014). I suppose a machine has neither 
dignity nor deserves reverence.
Only when there is reverence, with its foundation on the reality of being 
a person, with human dignity, understood as a human being no matter 
what their self-awareness and autonomy may be, can one foster good-will 
toward others in “one’s froth”. Otherwise, benevolence would be impossible 
or merely the accompanying result of well-being, a nice digestion, comfort-
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ableness or self-satisfaction, at most the result of an evolved “reciprocal 
altruism” (Trivers 1971). This nothing to do with real love, which resides 
in the will –no doubt with some frontal lobe correlate- and, as such, can be 
commanded. It follows intelligence, acknowledging the intrinsic value or 
dignity of every human individual, even the most depraved ones, who may 
have made themselves subjectively unworthy of it. 
4. Spiritual love
However, this belief can only be true if its reason is not found in this world 
of things practical, calculable, replaceable - material or biological. Neither 
would it be in a different universe part of a possible multiverse but still with 
some form of material energy as its basis. The intrinsic dignity of any human 
being or person, no matter at which stage or condition in their life (i.e. an 
unborn or Down syndrome child, a paraplegic or an adult with Alzheimer’s 
disease) can only rest on the fact of having been created by God in his own 
image, on who one is, not on what one can accomplish autonomously. Besides, 
if we do not think of persons as creatures endowed with a co-substantial 
embodied immortal spirit and wanted individually by God, not mere acci-
dents of a biological chain, we run the risk –also pointed out by Wyatt- of 
falling into an undesired dualism separating body (which may be there in 
its integrity at the disposal of the inner self) and conscious awareness (the 
inner self), which may be absent because of brain damage or just sleep.1
One’s personhood is not “cortical”: it does not disappear if the cerebral 
cortex starts to malfunction. In Christian thinking, as Wyatt also remarks, 
whatever happens to us in the future, whatever disease or accident may befall 
our central nervous system, even if we are struck down by dementia or enter 
a persistent vegetative state, we remain the same person, with the same 
immortal spirit, perhaps without conscious awareness, but uniquely wanted 
by God. There may be no autonomy then but some kind of dependence is 
part and parcel of human life from the beginning of our conception: were we 
1 In that sense, the functional distinction between body and mind, the natural self, on the 
one hand, and spirit, the supernatural one, on the other, reveals itself as very useful.
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not ourselves then when clinging to our mother’s endometrium, depending 
on her benevolence? And what about later on, in the continuum of our life, 
when we may have to take care of her or we have to be taken care of by 
others? A universe made up of completely independent beings would be 
a selfish, elitist and horrible autistic nightmare, a kind of futuristic robotic 
singularity some are already predicting. 
This dignity-based reverence makes it possible to love others not because 
of their lovableness, or their human category or a good turn they may have 
done to us but because they are created in the image of the Creator, persons, 
with or without autonomy or intact cognitive capacities. This love is the gift 
of oneself for the good of others - it is wholly other-oriented and directed to 
their welfare and benefit. A love rooted in pleasing oneself is self-centered 
and possessive - it is a selfish love that takes from others rather than giving 
to them. It is possessive of one’s children, unconsciously thought of as if 
they were ours rather than a gift we have been entrusted with and, as such, 
“planned and obtained” when and how we choose and not in the way in 
which they have the right to come into this world (and also “let go” -as in 
the English euphemism for sacking someone- of their clinging to us for 
continued existence).
This love is similar to what Lewis (1960) calls agape, a love purified of 
all self-seeking dross, which may be concomitant with likings or fondness 
for particular people but doesn’t depend on them. It has nothing to do 
with feelings though it doesn’t exclude them. What is more, it leads one 
to encourage the latter in oneself and even triggers them when they are 
not naturally present by acting on it, because this is a love with deeds, not 
necessarily with feelings (which cannot be commanded to experience). 
These “will to love” deeds have a feedback effect on those natural affections, 
increasing them. The opposite is also true: acting on natural dislikes instead 
produces increasing psychological distance from those people so disliked.2 
As Lewis (1943) also puts it: “the more cruel you are, the more you will 
2 This is consistent with something widely attested in psychiatry, the capacity of the mind 
to change the brain when focusing on wholesome things through natural or supernatural 
motives (cf. Schwartz & Begley 2002).
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hate; and the more you hate, the more cruel you will become—and so on 
in a vicious circle forever” (p. 117).
Dr. Robert Sapolsky (2010) –a professor at Standford university and 
a leading neuroscientist and primatologist, a “strident atheist”, in his own 
words– confesses his perplexity about this type of love, which extends even 
to the unlovable and unforgivable, and considers it to be the most defining 
feature about who we are, still more that others such as a far deeper theory 
of mind (degrees of abstraction and spatio-temporal diverse hypothetical 
states or events), language, communication, cooperation and sexual behavior. 
He gives the example of Helen Prejean, the nun attending to death row 
convicts made famous by the 1995 film “Dead man walking”. The answer she 
gives to the frequent question about the reason why she does this ministry 
(“The less forgivable the act, the more must be forgiven; the less lovable the 
person is, the more you must find the means to love him”) strikes Sapolsky 
as “the most irrational, magnificent thing we are capable of as a species”, 
whereby we go far past the things we can do with respect to theory of mind, 
empathy or culture. For him, this is the ultimate reason for our uniqueness 
as a species. Note that he characterizes it as something that goes beyond 
our cognitive faculties, which could never explain it.
It is very difficult to conceive how a love like this, which may be heroic, 
far beyond our own natural capabilities, even reaching out to one’s enemies,3 
could spring up just as part of the activity of a material brain and encom-
passing hormones. Nor is it easy to imagine what evolutionary advantage 
it might have towards spreading an impossible mutation which could have 
given rise to such quirk in an ancestral brain.4 There is something here away 
3 Like that of the woman who not only forgives the man, on death row at present, who killed 
her daughter and grand-daughter but gives him support in his life-time prison, as de-
scribed in the film Human (2015) by Arthus-Bertrand. This film contains many examples 
of the type of love we are addressing here –along with painful (in)human experiences of 
which mankind is also capable- and of the yearning for it by people from all cultures and 
walks of life.
4 To quote some pop evolutionary psychology, one of the Kryptonites in the movie Man of 
Steel (2013), played by actor Antje Traue, who fights Superman, explains to him, how they, 
a people more evolved than humans, have learned that evolution is incompatible with 
a sense of morality. 
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and above emotions, natural affections or mere rationality, which points to 
something qualitatively different from the result of material evolution, to 
some kind of spiritual principle not susceptible of evolving into being. It is 
comparable, in another field, to what Chomsky (2015) thinks about the origin 
of language. He conceives of it not as an evolution from previous skills or 
abilities, though it may recruit some of them, but rather as something that 
comes into being as such, probably along with our mathematical ability, with 
no predecessors. The difference here is that the latter responds, according to 
the famous linguist, to a sudden genetic mutation in an individual and the 
love we are describing seems more like an infused gift from outside our own 
realm, though capable of becoming incarnate in humanity.5 An individual 
may or may not be conscious of this capacity, not develop it or even forfeit it 
temporarily before coming to fruition because of their upbringing. Still the 
capacity remains, unlike one of those biological instincts subject to critical 
or sensitive periods, which, if not exercised or provided input to, does not 
develop properly. In any case, it would really be rare in someone who had 
not refined his spirit before by previous acts of generosity or dedication to 
others in their lives. 
As humans, then, we are all capable of both giving and receiving this 
type of love, no matter what our other capacities may be: giving, that is, 
provided we have not degraded our humanity; receiving, if there is someone 
around us with some spiritual life. This kind of love makes us similar to the 
God of the New Testament, who is Love (1 Io 4, 16). Without going into its 
deeper theological consequences, this means that God’s essence is that kind 
of disinterested love which doesn’t depend on satisfying a need or feeling. It 
is a pure outpouring for the sake of the persons so loved, capable of giving 
one’s life for them, with nothing material entering into it. 
If, as the Bible says, we are made in the image and likeness of God (Gen 
1, 27), because God infused his spirit in man (Gen 2, 7) and God’s essence is 
Love, our inmost core then is made up of the spirit of God, that is, of love, 
and a love of the kind described. Therefore, what is most specifically human 
5 Isn’t that what it is meant about Jesus Christ when defined as “Love incarnate”?
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is that interchange of unselfish, disinterested love, and living by and growing 
in it is what humanizes us most, much more than being experts in neurology, 
physics, linguistics or evolutionary psychology; or having accomplished all 
kinds of career goals, let alone displaying a beautiful or voluptuous body. And 
this is rather encouraging, something we are all endowed with, no matter 
our intelligence or sophistication, and are capable of even if confined to 
a wheel-chair or slowly losing our mind. This may smack to some of “slave 
morality”, the sort Nietzsche -with his “will to power”- loathed so deeply. 
He was the champion of the famous autonomy (though he may have felt 
happy that his sister did not act upon it in his final bed-ridden days).
Conclusion
The philosopher T. Nagel (2012), again another atheist, explains very 
clearly how there must be more to humans than the sole result of natural 
(evolutionary) processes:
If we continue to assume that we are parts of the physical world and that the 
evolutionary process that brought us into existence is part of its history, then 
something must be added to the physical conception of the natural order 
that allows us to explain how it can give rise to organisms that are more than 
physical. The resources of physical science are not adequate for this purpose, 
because those resources were developed to account for data of a completely 
different kind (p. 46). 
The spiritual love that has been dealt with here is one of those properties 
that do not seem to be amenable to such physicalist explanations. With 
Sapolsky, this is really the unique feature, qualitatively different, which 
sets us apart from other non-human animals. We are the only ones capable 
of this will-to-love love; even those with a poor intellectual life for lack of 
exposure to an education or an environment conducive to it. Still, even 
those deprived individuals, if mentally normal otherwise -as spirit in our 
case is destined to be incarnate- are capable of a disinterested, heroic love 
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as well as of addressing their creator, the source of it, something other 
animals are unable to do6.
We may once reach that singularity mentioned before, with the human 
era at an end once super-intelligent robots are made. These, in turn, may 
build even better machines with the intelligence of man left far behind, at 
the mercy of large computer networks. Those who think that robots may get 
to have the same faculties and emotions of a human being are wrong about 
one thing at least: the type of love described here, whose substance cannot 
be programmed or recreated because it cannot be analyzed into components, 
as is the essence of spirit, even when incarnate. I just hope they don’t come 
to be regarded as persons for all their self-awareness and autonomy. In any 
case, I doubt they will ever adopt dependent, handicapped robots and care 
for them, a clear sign of the loss of humanity at heart7.
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